65% Possession, Still Defeated: Lessons from Vietnam's Match Against Indonesia

In the 88th minute at Gelora Bung Karno Stadium, a sharp whistle blew after Egy Maulana Vikri broke free and finished into the far corner. Indonesia took the lead. On the LED screen, Vietnam's possession rate at that moment was 65%. That number felt like a mockery: we had more of the ball, more passes, but failed to register a single shot on target in the entire second half. Meanwhile, the hosts had only three threats on goal yet scored the decisive goal. For too long, Vietnamese football fans have been obsessed with the concept of "possession." Under former head coach Park Hang-seo, we witnessed an effective defensive counter-attacking style, which was later criticized as "negative football." When Kim Sang-sik took charge, he brought the ambition of playing possession-based football, controlling the game with more of the ball. Big friendly wins over weaker sides convinced many that this was the right path. In reality, what happened in Jakarta was no accident. From the home draw against the Philippines, where Vietnam had 68% possession but conceded a 1-1 equalizer from a counter-attack, to the loss to Iraq in the second group match, the same script repeated. The more we held the ball, the deeper the opponents sat, and the bigger the space behind them. But Vietnam lacked a player capable of receiving the ball and beating a full-back, nor a central midfielder daring to play line-breaking passes. Statistics from the 2026 World Cup qualifiers showed Vietnam attempted 614 passes with 87% accuracy, but only 35% of them were forward. Most were lateral passes between center-backs and full-backs, maintaining control without creating any disruption. Indonesia did not even need to press high; they simply set up a low block, closed down every gap, and waited for counter-attacking chances. For a precise assessment, I used the PPDA metric (opposition passes allowed per defensive action). In this match, Indonesia's PPDA was 9.2, meaning they allowed Vietnam to make about nine passes before stepping out. With such a comfortable threshold, Vietnam could pass around, but once approaching the final 25 meters, every pass was shut down. Players like Quang Hai and Hoang Duc had to drop deep to receive the ball, losing all penetrative threat. As a result, Vietnam had only 4 shots in the whole match, 1 on target. That is the number of a timid team, not a team controlling the game. Compared to Indonesia, they had only 35% possession, but managed 7 shots with 3 on target. They simplified the game: defend with numbers, launch long balls to two speedy wingers, and maximize every counter-attack. It was not beautiful football, but it brought results. Vietnam, meanwhile, intoxicated by lateral passes, forgot that goals are the ultimate purpose. The truth is that possession is not a weapon without circulation into the box. Top European clubs like Manchester City can control 70% possession, but they always have quick combinations and long diagonal passes. Vietnam, however, was too safe. Against Indonesia, we did not complete a single triangle in the opponent's area. Striker Nguyen Tien Linh had to drop out of the box to build up play, unintentionally losing a focal point. I have followed more than 200 matches of the national team over 20 years and never seen such a huge gap between possession and attacking efficiency as now. Personally, I always support possession football because it reduces pressure on the defense. But passive possession is only a disguise for a lack of ideas. The silent hero does not need goals to be remembered, but the midfield must know how to move the ball forward. Look at players like Nguyen Hoang Duc, described as a "fake number 10" for his ball-carrying ability but lack of decisive passes. He can hold the ball in front of the box, dribble past two or three defenders, but then pass back or shoot over the bar. Hoang Duc needs to understand that the number 10 shirt is sometimes a curtain covering emptiness, and he is losing himself in this role. If he does not change, he will forever be wasted talent. As for Coach Kim Sang-sik, I believe he has enough experience to see the issue. But the South Korean tactician must be braver in making changes. Sticking with the old structure of three slow center-backs has exposed too many weaknesses against teams with pace. Perhaps it is time to switch to a 4-3-3 with two fast wingers to exploit the space behind the opponent's defense. Of course, I could be wrong. Maybe in the next matches, Vietnam will suddenly play direct attacking football and score through small combinations. But based on what I have seen, I bet on an inevitable change. Otherwise, this World Cup qualifying campaign will quickly end with regrets.