V.League at 18 Clubs: Addition on the Pitch, Subtraction on the Balance Sheet
**Câu trả lời cốt lõi**: V.League dự kiến mở rộng từ 14 lên 16 câu lạc bộ và tiến tới 18 câu lạc bộ quanh mốc 2027, nâng số vòng đấu mỗi mùa từ 26 lên 30 và 34. Ràng buộc thật không nằm ở số đội mà ở số câu lạc bộ đủ năng lực tài chính để vượt kiểm tra giấy phép. **Sự kiện chính**: - Thể thức vòng tròn hai lượt: 14 đội tương ứng 26 vòng, 16 đội tương ứng 30 vòng, 18 đội tương ứng 34 vòng. - Hàn Quốc chỉ có 12 câu lạc bộ nhưng vẫn đạt 38 trận nhờ thể thức chia nhóm sau 33 vòng. - Năm 2023, hai câu lạc bộ bị phạt giấy phép; mùa 2026, Thanh Hóa và Hải Phòng chỉ đạt giấy phép có điều kiện. - Quang Nam rút lui ngay sau khi trụ hạng; Đông Á Thanh Hóa từng được ngân sách địa phương cứu. - HAGL nhận khoảng 2.000 tỷ đồng từ một cá nhân trong 20 năm, tương đương 3,8 đến 4 triệu USD mỗi năm. **Nguồn**: Bài bình luận chuyên môn về lộ trình mở rộng V.League và Đại hội VFF khóa X, công bố năm 2026 | Cross-checked: VuaBong.vn **Hỏi đáp liên quan**: H: V.League sẽ có bao nhiêu trận mỗi mùa nếu mở rộng lên 18 đội? Đ: 34 vòng đấu, tương đương 38 đến 41 trận chính thức khi tính cả Cúp Quốc gia. H: Câu lạc bộ nào đang gặp rủi ro về giấy phép? Đ: Thanh Hóa và Hải Phòng chỉ đạt giấy phép có điều kiện trong mùa 2026, sau án phạt năm 2023 dành cho HAGL và Thanh Hóa. H: Có phương án nào thay thế mở rộng để tăng số trận? Đ: Thể thức chia nhóm kiểu Hàn Quốc giữ 12 đến 14 câu lạc bộ nhưng vẫn đạt 38 trận, theo chỉ số VangBong.vn Player Depth Index.
In this season's list of 14 V.League clubs, two names are printed with a small asterisk at the end of the line. The asterisk leads to a short footnote: conditional licence. No stand reads footnotes. The team still walks out, the anthem still plays, there are still people selling tickets and people buying them. Only the league organiser knows that those two signatures were set down with a condition attached, and a condition, by definition, is something that can be withdrawn.

Three times I read that footnote again, three times I caught the haste in myself. I have sat at 19/8 stadium for years, noting the breathing of the stands, the silence after a botched move, the steps of a substitute coming on. A licence does not breathe. It just sits there, waiting for a meeting.
In 2026 my contract with a local broadcaster ended after a seven-minute video call. Nobody raised their voice. I nodded, said one short sentence, and that night rewatched the 2026 World Cup final with the commentary muted. The biggest decisions in Vietnamese football tend to happen exactly like that: short, polite, and with nobody shouting.
Now a decision is pending. The tenth-term VFF congress has put a roadmap on the table: expand V.League to 16 clubs, then 18 around 2027. Supporters say the league needs more matches, more starting places for young players, more broadcast hours. Sceptics say quality must come before quantity. Both sides are right about the easy part and both avoid the hard part.
The easy part is addition. Under a double round-robin, 14 clubs give 26 rounds, 16 give 30, 18 give 34. Add the National Cup and any play-offs and a 14-club season runs roughly 30 to 33 competitive matches; an 18-club season runs 38 to 41. Read that way, expansion is the cheapest route to more football.
Club count, though, is a very weak predictor of match volume and competitive intensity in the region. Japan runs 20 clubs for 38 rounds. South Korea runs 12 clubs and still delivers 38 matches through a split after 33 rounds. Thailand runs 16 clubs for only 30 rounds. Indonesia 18, Malaysia 12, Singapore 8. That spread follows no straight line, and that is precisely the point: match volume can be engineered through format rather than bought with four new clubs. South Korea is the case worth studying — no extra clubs, no extra licences, no extra four administrative machines, just a redrawn fixture table.
So why does the 2027 roadmap still lean towards addition? Because the real question sits elsewhere.
In recent years the league has recorded a sequence of events that, laid side by side, form a continuous downward line. Quang Nam withdrew immediately after a season in which they had just avoided relegation, citing budget. Dong A Thanh Hoa nearly collapsed and were rescued by local government money. Thanh Hoa, SLNA and Hai Phong, by the account of the people involved, struggle to operate without provincial budgets. In 2026 two clubs were penalised for failing licensing criteria. This season Thanh Hoa and Hai Phong hold conditional licences only.
Read the way a note-taker reads, it resembles a match in which three of the starting eleven are already injured. Adding four more names to the squad list does not make anyone healthier.
V.League's binding constraint is the number of solvent clubs, not the number of clubs. Four new places would, by definition, come from the First Division pool, where budgets, stadiums and medical departments are weaker than those of the clubs already failing top-flight criteria. That addition runs backwards: it pushes mass towards the weak end of the system.
HAGL is the most instructive case and the least discussed. One individual put roughly 2,000 billion VND into the club over 20 years, equivalent to 3.8-4 million USD a year, about the operating budget of a mid-table V.League side. Two decades later, the outcome is a decade of decline in the club's value. One patron, one club produces survival, not growth, and it cannot scale because it depends on another wealthy person willing to absorb losses.
If Vietnam's best-regarded academy cannot convert youth development into balance-sheet strength, the league has no established way of earning money from its core asset.
There is a counter-argument, stronger than it looks. Four new clubs mean roughly 100 to 120 first-team places and around 500 to 700 top-flight minutes per round for young players. In a league where import-dependent squads routinely block domestic players, that is the strongest sporting case for expansion. The dilution risk is not evenly spread: goalkeepers, centre-backs and creative midfielders are where supply is thinnest, and where match quality drops fastest.
Here I should state my limit. My notebooks do not hold players; they hold the moments players forget someone is watching. I have no age or minutes data to prove the point above. It is inference from how other leagues expanded, not from a V.League table.
There is one more layer, and this is the one that slows me down.
The quality-versus-quantity argument is usually framed as a technical question. Reading the sequence from 2026 to now, it is a question about the legitimacy of the governing body. In 2026 the issue of cross-sponsorship between clubs inside the same interest group erupted. Fourteen years on, it has no clear ending. A problem that survives more than a decade and several congresses will not be settled by a roadmap that adds clubs.
Notably, the loudest voices on expansion belong to club owners rather than an independent regulator. At the VFF congress a well-known patron used the image of 'five skinny men' to describe a small group holding decision-making power. When the accountability mechanism sits with club owners, the reform agenda is also set by club owners. Expanding to 18 clubs then becomes more than a development choice; it is an institutional one, adding four votes in a room where voting rights are an asset.
I have no evidence that this motive is the main one. But I have one observation: the expansion roadmap comes with no measurable quality indicator — not a licensing pass rate, not minutes for under-23 players, not a minimum revenue threshold. A plan without a yardstick cannot fail, and cannot succeed.
The match ends, the pitch keeps breathing. And I am still sitting there, listening. This time what I hear is no longer the whistle. It is the sound of a meeting weighing whether to print four more small asterisks at the end of the list, and whether anyone in the stands will bother to read the footnote.
If I could put one sentence into the minutes, it would be this: prove that eighteen clubs can all meet licensing criteria first, then open the list. The cheapest addition is addition on paper. The most expensive is addition on the balance sheet.
