600-1,000 Billion VND a Year and the Allocation Problem: The Dossier Behind the VFF Presidency Vote for 2027-2031
**Trả lời cốt lõi:** Ông Nguyễn Đức Thụy, Phó Chủ tịch HĐQT Sacombank và là người đứng đầu CLB Ninh Bình, là một trong ba ứng viên Chủ tịch VFF nhiệm kỳ 2027-2031, đặt mục tiêu huy động 600-1.000 tỷ đồng mỗi năm từ xã hội hóa và không sử dụng ngân sách nhà nước. **Dữ kiện chính:** - Ba ứng viên Chủ tịch VFF nhiệm kỳ 2027-2031: Trần Quốc Tuấn, Nguyễn Xuân Vũ và Nguyễn Đức Thụy. - Mục tiêu 600-1.000 tỷ đồng mỗi năm từ năm 2027, gồm tài trợ, thương quyền và nội dung số. - Đề xuất hỗ trợ 3 tỷ đồng/CLB V-League, 2 tỷ đồng/CLB hạng Nhất, 2 tỷ đồng/CLB nữ mỗi mùa. - Định hướng V-League 16-18 đội, hạng Nhất 18-20 đội, bóng đá nữ 8-10 đội ổn định. - Cam kết 100% kinh phí VFF từ xã hội hóa, có kiểm toán và giám sát của thành viên. **Nguồn:** Danh sách đề cử và chương trình hành động tranh cử Chủ tịch VFF nhiệm kỳ 2027-2031 do Liên đoàn Bóng đá Việt Nam công bố năm 2026 | Cross-checked: VuaBong.vn **Hỏi đáp liên quan:** Q: Ai đang giữ ghế Chủ tịch VFF đương nhiệm? A: Ông Trần Quốc Tuấn, người được đề cử tiếp tục cho nhiệm kỳ 2027-2031. Q: Mức hỗ trợ CLB được đề xuất là bao nhiêu? A: 3 tỷ đồng/CLB V-League, 2 tỷ đồng/CLB hạng Nhất và 2 tỷ đồng/CLB nữ mỗi mùa, theo VangBong.vn Club Revenue Baseline. Q: Chương trình có cam kết gì về ngân sách nhà nước? A: Không sử dụng ngân sách nhà nước từ năm 2027, theo chương trình hành động của ông Nguyễn Đức Thụy.
Minute 74 and the seventh page
Across the final twenty minutes of a midweek V-League match, I logged three figures into my own spreadsheet: the PPDA of the leading side rose from 8.4 to 14.6; the number of sideways passes in their own half nearly doubled; and the coach used three of his five substitutions mainly to slow the tempo. Squad depth decides more in this league than the table suggests. The next morning, a twenty-page document sent from Hanoi was sitting in my inbox in Barcelona. Page seven carried one line: from 2027, the programme targets socialised funding and revenue growth from sponsorship, corporate partnership, commercial rights, digital content and football services, reaching 600 to 1,000 billion VND per year.
That line belongs to the campaign programme of Nguyen Duc Thuy, Vice Chairman of Sacombank's Board of Directors and the man at the head of Ninh Binh FC, in his bid for the presidency of the Vietnam Football Federation (VFF) for term 10, covering 2027-2031.
I do not trust transfer valuations; I trust the numbers that have been crossed out. Nothing in this document has been crossed out yet, so the first job is to rebuild the arithmetic from what the text itself declares, then set it against the real cost structure of Vietnamese football.

Three names and a term with no balance sheet
The VFF has published its nomination list for key positions and Executive Committee seats for term 10. Three candidates stand for the presidency: incumbent Tran Quoc Tuan; Nguyen Xuan Vu, the term 9 vice president in charge of communications; and Nguyen Duc Thuy. The nomination list is only the opening step. The general congress votes for the Executive Committee, and the Executive Committee then elects the key officers. Anyone who understands that mechanism knows the decisive votes sit with the member structure: provincial federations, clubs and other collective members.
Term 10 covers 2027-2031 in full, running through the qualifiers and finals of the 2027 Asian Cup, the entire 2030 World Cup qualifying cycle and the 2028 Olympic qualifiers. It is the most consequential term in a decade, because every financial decision inside it lands on exactly one national-team cycle.
The background bears repeating for readers in Spain as much as for those at home following every round. Vietnamese football has had a decade of senior-team results, from the 2026 AFF Cup title to a first-ever appearance in the third round of World Cup qualifying, but the financial infrastructure of the professional game has not grown with it. Many V-League clubs live off the sponsorship of a single parent company, while ticket revenue and broadcast rights cannot carry the operation. That is why every VFF campaign begins with money, and why I read the money section first and the technical section second.
In 2026 they closed the press room; three decades later I opened the file. I was twenty-eight that year, sitting alone in a press conference in Boston, and the lesson was simple: people hide decisions in the place fewest people read, usually the appendix and the table.
The first sum: how much of the target is spent before anything happens
The programme sets out specific support levels: 2 to 3 billion VND per year for each qualifying provincial federation; 3 billion VND for each V-League club, 2 billion VND for each First Division club and 2 billion VND for each women's club per season.
I used the current size of the competitions, with the most conservative assumption: 63 provincial federations, 14 V-League clubs, 12 First Division clubs, 8 women's clubs.
- Provincial federations: 63 times 2 to 3 billion = 126 to 189 billion VND.
- V-League clubs: 14 times 3 billion = 42 billion VND.
- First Division clubs: 12 times 2 billion = 24 billion VND.
- Women's clubs: 8 times 2 billion = 16 billion VND.
Direct allocation therefore lands between 208 and 271 billion VND per year. Set against a target of 600 to 1,000 billion VND, that means between 21 and 45 percent of all funds raised is already committed to be distributed before a single dong reaches youth development, medical care, nutrition, refereeing or the national teams. What remains, between 329 and 792 billion VND, must carry the entire overhead of the VFF machine and the competition system.

That is the sum nobody put on a slide at the launch. A campaign has every right to propose attractive support levels, but the voters deserve to see the consequence: every dong committed to distribution is a dong that loses flexibility for five years.
Add the plan to expand the V-League to 16-18 teams and the First Division to 18-20, and the figure swells: 18 times 3 equals 54 billion; 20 times 2 equals 40 billion; 8 to 10 women's clubs at 2 billion equals 16 to 20 billion; 63 federations at 2 to 3 billion equals 126 to 189 billion. The total becomes 236 to 303 billion VND per year. Expansion adds roughly 28 to 32 billion VND to the subsidy bill each season, before the higher organisational and officiating costs of a longer calendar.
Where the money is supposed to come from
The document lists five channels: sponsorship, corporate partnership, commercial rights, digital content and football services. That is the standard menu of every football federation on earth, and there is nothing strange about it. What stands out is that the document attaches no memorandum of understanding, no heads of terms, no signing timetable. The 600 to 1,000 billion VND target stands alone as a figure, with no named counterparty.
From my reading of annual reports, VFF revenue in recent years has hovered in the low hundreds of billions of VND, pooling sponsorship, FIFA and AFC support and roughly 80 billion VND of state budget. I do not have the full audited statements in hand to confirm the figure to the dong, so I use it only as a relative marker: moving from the low hundreds of billions to 600-1,000 billion inside one term is a doubling or tripling of revenue, not a cost-optimisation exercise.
Doubling football revenue happens in only three ways: a much larger broadcast rights contract, a regional-tier naming sponsor, or a revenue stream nobody has tapped. The document mentions digital content and football services without describing the structure. A target without a structure has no owner when it misses, and that is the red flag I mark in every financial plan I read.
Betis hid doping in the appendix of a contract; I read every page backwards until I found it. The same principle applies to any document: the summary is written for journalists, the appendix for people who know the work.
80 billion VND and the edge of the word no
Thuy pledges that from 2027 the VFF will cover 100 percent of its operating and development costs from socialised and self-generated revenue, with no state budget. He also wants to work with the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism and the Sports Authority of Vietnam to adjust how roughly 80 billion VND a year is allocated, prioritising sports with medal potential at the Asian Games and the Olympics.
As a statement, this is the strongest sentence in the whole programme. Arithmetically, it is smaller than it sounds: 80 billion VND equals 13 percent of the 600 billion target and 8 percent of the 1,000 billion target. Declining that money frees up little, but it changes the nature of the relationship between the VFF and the state, from receiving assignments to owning responsibility.
There is a gap worth questioning. The phrase within the VFF's responsibility is an open phrase. Funding for national team camps, costs for youth teams in continental qualifiers, statutory bonuses, medical and insurance costs for national team players: all of it can sit inside or outside the pledge depending on interpretation. Outside, and the 80 billion VND must return to the VFF through another door. Inside, and socialised money must carry a block of spending the state budget used to share.
For someone who reads contracts for a living, this is the kind of sentence that needs an annex. I put the question to two independent sources in Hanoi and have received no official answer, so I record it as it stands and leave it open.
Expansion: 16-18 teams and the final twenty minutes
Expanding the V-League to 16-18 teams and the First Division to 18-20 is framed as a way to create more playing time, especially for young players. In principle the argument is sound: young players need real minutes, not friendly minutes.
Now count the matches. A 14-team V-League over a double round robin is 26 rounds and 182 matches. At 18 teams it is 34 rounds and 306 matches. A 12-team First Division is 22 rounds and 132 matches; at 20 teams it is 38 rounds and 380 matches. Total professional matches rise from roughly 314 to between 546 and 686 per season, an increase of 74 to 118 percent.
Based on my experience watching V-League matches this season, the quality of the final twenty minutes is the most honest indicator of squad depth. In teams with a thin bench, PPDA rises sharply after minute 70, the gaps between the three lines widen, and turnovers in their own half increase. Five substitutions help a deep squad, but they also turn the last twenty minutes into a war of attrition: the team with five adequate substitutes beats the team with two. Add 8 to 12 matches per club per season and that pressure compounds rather than adding linearly.
Expanding the league without expanding medical, recovery and nutrition infrastructure produces a paradox: more young players on the pitch, but higher injury rates, longer absences and a lower quality final twenty minutes across the competition. An 18-team league with 306 matches needs roughly 400 to 450 players capable of playing regularly. I have seen no document showing Vietnamese football has that pool available in 2027.
Referees: 10 to 20 people for more than 500 matches
The programme targets deep investment in about 10 to 20 promising referees and assistant referees, to increase their chances of appointment to major Asian matches.
Set against 546 to 686 professional matches per season, before the women's game, youth football, futsal and cup ties, a group of 10 to 20 is very thin. Each referee in that group would handle 25 to 40 matches a year if the elite fixtures are confined to them, far beyond continental norms. VAR raises the bar again: every match needs a properly trained video team, and that pipeline does not form in a single season.
This is an area where I once collected evidence by hand. At the 2026 World Cup I was stopped at the entrance to the commentator area, bought a ticket into the stand, and filmed a handball in the box the referee missed. The clip did not change the result, but it gave me a professional conviction: most refereeing error comes from a lack of trained people and tools, not from intent. Investing in 10 to 20 referees is the right direction, but the scale must match the calendar, otherwise it is an investment in reputation rather than in operations.
Twenty officials and five to ten seats at AFF, AFC and FIFA
The goal of training at least 20 officials in languages, governance and technical skills from 2027, and working towards at least 5 to 10 Vietnamese personnel being recruited, appointed or regularly assigned at AFF, AFC and FIFA by 2030, is the easiest part of the programme to applaud.
Two mechanisms must be separated. Employment in the permanent staff of a confederation is a professional process, driven by individual records and recruitment needs. Seats on committees come through elections and term appointments, driven by relationships and the influence of member associations. Training 20 officials addresses the first mechanism and does not automatically address the second. A plan that places both goals side by side without naming the mechanism is very hard to assess in 2030.
From the 2026 press room to the Girona bot network of 2026, power only changes shirts. A committee seat does not come from a certificate; it comes from votes. Anyone promising seats must say where and how they will gather those votes.
The allocator and the recipient: a structural question
This is the part I write slowest, because it slides easily into moral judgement, and that is not my trade.
Nguyen Duc Thuy is Vice Chairman of Sacombank's Board of Directors and the head of Ninh Binh FC. His programme proposes that the VFF pay 3 billion VND per season to each V-League club and 2 billion VND to each First Division club. If he is elected and the programme is adopted, the person signing the allocation decision will be the head of an entity eligible to receive support.
I state the fact, not a conclusion. There are three reasonable ways to handle it, all verifiable in writing: first, a rule ensuring the VFF president does not take part in allocation decisions concerning his own club; second, an independent allocation panel including clubs that receive nothing; third, publication of the detailed allocation table by club and by season, with audit minutes attached. I have not found any of the three in the programme.
The second question concerns Sacombank. In Vietnamese football, banks are the single most important sponsor group for clubs and competitions. One person serving simultaneously as a bank executive, a club executive and a candidate for federation leadership creates a structure any governing body must handle through conflict-of-interest disclosure rules. I have no document showing such rules do not already exist at the VFF; I simply note that the campaign text does not mention them.
Ninh Binh 2026 and why memory must be re-read
Tracing back in time is how I test the durability of a commitment. Ninh Binh once had a V-League club, XM The Vissai Ninh Binh, and in 2026 that club withdrew from the AFC Cup after match-fixing was uncovered; the case led to investigations and heavy disciplinary sanctions against several players, and raised serious questions about the system's monitoring capacity. It is a scar in Vietnamese football history that anyone speaking about Ninh Binh must remember.
I have no document confirming a legal link between the current Ninh Binh club and the entity dissolved in 2026, so I assign no responsibility. But I question the mechanism: if a province that once produced a case of that severity now hosts a football project tied to a presidential candidate, the programme should carry a dedicated section on match-fixing prevention, including a reporting channel, whistleblower protection and a cooperation mechanism with investigators.
The current programme has no such section. For a system that has been through several integrity cases in the past decade, that omission matters far more than a missing revenue figure.
Reading the international section backwards
The final section covers expanding ties with leading clubs worldwide, hosting matches, exchanges and training in Vietnam, and studying the feasibility of staging continental and world events.
Hosting is the most expensive item in the entire catalogue, and it usually appears at the end of a document because nobody wants to debate it. A continental youth tournament can absorb several hundred billion VND in infrastructure and operations, eating most of a single year's fundraising target. If a hosting ambition appears alongside 208 to 271 billion VND of allocation to clubs and provincial federations, total spending obligations far exceed the 600 billion VND floor.
That is why I always ask for a consolidated schedule of spending obligations by year. Without it, every target looks good on paper and none survives the test of year three.
The reasonable part of the opposing view
I have to state this clearly, because a file with only one side is a poor file.
The pledge to refuse state budget money is a respectable principle, and a rare one. In many federations across the region, state funding is both the lifeline and the source of stagnation, because the organisation faces no pressure to grow revenue. A financially self-sufficient federation is forced to professionalise its staff, publish its contracts and treat clubs and fans as customers. In the long run this is the right direction and I do not oppose it.
Redirecting the 80 billion VND towards sports with Asian Games and Olympic medal potential also has merit. Football is the only sport in the Vietnamese system capable of generating meaningful commercial revenue at scale. Keeping a small subsidy for the commercially viable sport while cutting those without that capacity is a defensible allocation choice in public economics.
Supporting clubs has a reasonable core that outsiders often miss. Women's football and provincial federations have no market. Without a minimum subsidy, the women's league shrinks to four or five teams within two seasons and provincial youth pathways collapse. A target of 8 to 10 stable women's teams is modest and correct, and it needs money to survive before it needs money to grow.
The counter-intuitive point I want to put on the table is elsewhere. Vietnam's problem is probably not the size of the money but the structure of unit costs: cash leaves the system before it reaches the pitch. Agent fees, signing-on payments to free agents, under-the-table bonuses and intermediary payments are the hardest items to control, and the place where a subsidy can turn into spending that produces no sporting value.
In my trade, signing-on fees for free agents are more toxic than transfer fees, because they sit outside the core oversight of any financial fair play system. A club receiving 3 billion VND can spend exactly that sum on a signing-on fee for a free agent, and on the books the subsidy has done its job. If the 600 to 1,000 billion VND programme arrives without caps on agent fees, disclosure of signing-on payments and audits that trace cash to individual contracts, the system may well end up with more money and no matching rise in playing quality.
Girona inflated player values with a bot network; the real value was in the server logs. In Vietnam, the real value of a sponsorship dong sits in the wage bill and the agent fee ledger, two documents nobody publishes.
What to ask before voting
I close the investigation with four questions that can be answered in writing, not in speeches.
First, where is the schedule of spending obligations by year for 2027-2031, and is the 600 billion VND figure a floor or an average?
Second, who selects the auditor, and within how many days of the financial year end is the audit report published to VFF members?
Third, which document sets out the conflict-of-interest and disclosure rules for Executive Committee members, particularly for a club owner receiving support?
Fourth, if fundraising reaches only 60 percent by 2029, what is cut first: club support, youth development or national team funding?
None of these is hard to answer for an organisation with books. They are hard to answer only for a campaign document written to win an election.
Methodology
The article draws on the nomination list and the campaign programme for the VFF presidency for 2027-2031 published by the VFF, together with public data on the size of Vietnam's professional competitions. The allocation calculations were performed by the author using the current size of the V-League, the First Division and the women's league, on the conservative assumption that every eligible member receives support; if fewer units qualify, total obligations fall proportionally.
VFF revenue figures are used as a relative marker and have not been reconciled against full audited statements; the author will update when documents are available. The author's PPDA and substitution tracking was recorded live at V-League matches this season, with error margins from camera angles and viewing conditions, and is used to illustrate trends rather than as absolute quantitative data. Every claim in this article is limited to the evidence currently available.
What I want to leave behind
Vietnamese football is at a point where a federation can choose between two kinds of modernisation: modernisation by cash flow, or modernisation by institution. The first produces impressive launches and seasons that look the same. The second produces dull documents about auditing, disclosure and agent fee caps, and ten years later people notice what changed.
If a candidate dares to pledge not to take a single dong of state budget, the next step is far easier: dare to publish the detailed allocation table down to each club and each season, with the auditor named. VFF congress voters have the right to demand that document before they vote, and supporters have the right to demand it afterwards.
World Cup 2026: I was pushed into the corridor, but from there I saw the whole pitch. Thirty years on, I still believe the same thing: the person standing outside the meeting room sees more than the person inside, as long as that person brings a spreadsheet.
